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This finding suggests that in regions with less than perfect legal protection of
minority shareholders, ownership concentration is an efficient corporate governance
strategy. Yet, a focus on this aggregate effect alone conceals the existence of true
heterogeneity in the effect size distribution. We purposefully model this heteroge-
neity by exploring moderating effects at the levels of owner identity and national
institutions. Regarding owner identity, we find that our focal relationship is stronger
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institutions, we find that a certain threshold level of institutional development is
necessary to make concentrated ownership an effective corporate governance
strategy. Yet we also find that strong legal protection of shareholders makes
ownership concentration inconsequential and therefore redundant. Finally, in
jurisdictions where owners can easily extract private benefits from the corporations
they control, the focal relationship becomes weaker, presumably due to minority
shareholder expropriation.
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Introduction
According to one influential definition, the field of corporate governance “deals with
the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a
return on their investment” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997: 737). Correspondingly, to
secure their investments and enforce their claims to residual earnings, investors have
the choice between two broad governance strategies. The first is for them to rely on
the disciplinary force of external governance systems, like capital markets and the
legal system, to offer some form of protection against managerial opportunism or
expropriation by controlling shareholders (Gillan, 2006; Walsh & Seward, 1990).
The second is to concentrate their ownership, such that they can exert direct
influence on top managers to run the firm in their interest (Bolton & von Thadden,
1998; Coffee, 1991; Maug, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). In the present paper we
explore corporate governance choices in the Asian context. Characteristic for this
region is that investors here have opted massively for the governance strategy of
concentrated ownership (Carney & Gedajlovic, 2002; Claessens, Djankov, & Lang,
2000; La Porta, López-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999).
It is commonly held that concentrated ownership offers the best protection to
shareholders when legal protection is relatively weak, as is the case in most
Asian jurisdictions (Denis & McConnell, 2003). In this view, acquiring greater
control over corporations serves to fill the “institutional void” (Khanna & Palepu,
2000) left by weak or ineffective legal and financial institutions. Yet this
explanation seems overly crude, as it cannot account for the fact that although
concentrated ownership is an endemic feature of practically all Asian economies,
the levels of protection offered to shareholders differ greatly across Asian
jurisdictions (Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008). Another
recalcitrant finding that necessitates us to qualify the institutional voids
explanation is that concentrated ownership has remained remarkably stable over
time, in spite of the fact that corporate governance standards and legal institutions
catering to shareholders_ needs have improved markedly in many Asian
jurisdictions over the past two decades (e.g., Douma, George, & Kabir, 2006;
Gedajlovic, Yoshikawa, & Hashimoto, 2005). This warrants a more fine-grained
and contextualized account of the costs and benefits of concentrated ownership in
Asia; one that takes into account the subtly different institutional and corporate
governance configurations that can be found within the Asian context. The present
paper aims to provide such an account. It seeks to answer three salient questions
about concentrated ownership in Asia in particular.
First, given that ownership concentration is a widely used strategy through which
investors aim to ensure some reasonable return on their investment (Shleifer &
Vishny, 1997), we question the effectiveness of this broad corporate governance
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strategy within the Asian context. More particularly we ask: Do firms held by
concentrated owners outperform dispersedly owned firms in Asian jurisdictions?
Second, we explore the emerging insight in the corporate governance literature that
the relationship between ownership concentration and corporate performance is
likely to be moderated by the identity of the concentrated owner. Various strategies
for distinguishing between different kinds of concentrated owners exist. One is to
differentiate “foreign” from “domestic” owners (Douma et al., 2006). Another is to
classify owners alternatively as “stable,” “market,” or “inside” investors (Gedajlovic
et al., 2005; Gerlach, 1992). With respect to both of these common classifications,
the question we ask is: Does the identity of the concentrated owner matter to the
performance of Asian firms? Third, in line with the varieties of capitalism literature
(Hall & Soskice, 2001; Hollingsworth & Boyer, 1997), and the notion of
institutional complementarity more specifically (e.g., Aoki, 2001), we assume that
the associational strength of the relationship between ownership concentration and
firm performance in Asia will differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, due to subtly
different institutional configurations that have resulted from historically differing
paths of institutional development (Peng & Jiang, 2006). Our aim is to uncover the
specific institutional contingencies which make ownership concentration a more or
less effective corporate governance strategy in each of the Asian nations in our
sample. In other words: Is the relationship between ownership concentration and
firm performance in Asia moderated by jurisdiction-level institutions?
To address these three research questions, we require a database which is
simultaneously broad, deep, and historical (including as many countries, firms, and
observation years as possible). We have compiled and analyzed such a database with
the help of meta-analytical techniques (Hedges & Olkin, 1985; Lipsey & Wilson,
2001). Our final database covers 11 Asian countries and 660,087 firm-year
observations, derived from 65 primary studies and expressed in the form of 290
effect sizes. Specifically, we employed two groups of meta-analytical calculations.
To address research questions one and two, we used the meta-analytic methods
pioneered by Hedges and Olkin (1985). Due to its more precise and parsimonious
character (Rosenthal, 1991), this type is preferable to the presently more popular
artifact-corrected form of meta-analysis (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004) when the
underlying data involve accurately measured economic variables. To address
research question three, we used meta-analytic regression analysis (Lipsey &
Wilson, 2001). The benefit of meta-analytic regression is that it allows us to assess
whether jurisdiction-level moderating effects on the associational strength of the
focal relationship still hold in the presence of plausible control variables.1 Finally,
this paper demonstrates that meta-analysis is a very powerful methodological tool to
unpack the overall relationship between concentrated ownership and firm perfor-
mance in Asia, as it is capable of providing a more fine-grained understanding of its
1 In the words of Miller and Cardinal (1994: 1653): “analyzing [moderator] variables simultaneously in a
multiple regression format allows proper assessment of the relative explanatory power of each variable
because those variables directly compete against one another in the same statistical analyses.”
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cost and benefits in a part of the world in which it has historically been highly
prevalent.
Theory and research on concentrated ownership
Ownership concentration and firm performance in Asia
The empirical corporate governance literature offers no unequivocal answer to the
costs and benefits of concentrated ownership. Some scholars have found a positive
association with corporate performance (La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, &
Vishny, 2000a), others a negative association (Loderer & Martin, 1997), and still
others a curvilinear relationship (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988). Theoretically
compelling arguments can be furnished in favor of each finding.
Positive effects of concentrated ownership In a select number of jurisdictions
around the world, dispersed ownership is the norm. This is especially the case in
Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions such as the US and the UK (La Porta et al., 1999). An
important weakness of dispersed ownership, however, is that dispersed owners
lack both the means and the motive to address managerial agency problems. In the
presence of information asymmetry and interest misalignment between the owner/
principal and the manager/agent, problems associated with managerial opportun-
ism—such as lack of effort, on-the-job consumption, and empire building—loom
large (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In jurisdictions with
dispersed ownership, in which principals are typically both unwilling and unable to
act as effective monitors of publicly listed firms, the markets for corporate control,
equity capital, and executive talent are therefore the primary disciplinary forces
that keep managers in check (Gillan, 2006; Walsh & Seward, 1990). Yet in settings
where such markets are underdeveloped, as is often the case in Asia, investors have
no choice but to accept their role as firm monitors, which they can only exercise
effectively by concentrating their equity holdings. Concentrated ownership gives
them both more powerful incentives to become involved in governance, as well as
a means to influence managers by means of direct access strategies and the threat
of using their concentrated voting rights (David, Hitt, & Liang, 2007).
Concentrated shareholders can thus stimulate or even coerce the corporate
leadership to work in their interest. Additionally, in less antagonistic settings
concentrated shareholders can also use their vast resources and prior knowledge to
enhance managerial and organizational capabilities (Carney & Gedajlovic, 2001;
Weidenbaum & Hughes, 1996). Having a wealthy, concentrated owner can also
help firms in times of crisis, as such owners sometimes choose to transfer private
resources into an ailing firm. This phenomenon, also known as “propping,” can
help firms survive a temporary slump in performance, when owners choose “to
invest private cash today in order to preserve their options to expropriate and to
obtain a legitimate share of profits tomorrow” (Friedman, Johnson, & Mitton,
2003: 734). Hence as a general matter, a positive relationship is to be expected
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between ownership concentration and corporate performance in the Asian context.
See Hypothesis 1a:
Hypothesis 1a In Asia, ownership concentration is positively related to corporate
performance.
Negative effects of concentrated ownership Although concentrated owners have the
power to induce management to run the firm in their interest, these interests need not
converge with those of minority shareholders. Corporate governance scholars have
traditionally focused on the consequences of interest divergence between managers and
shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), yet a more recent
stream of corporate governance research focuses specifically on large shareholders_
attempts to expropriate smaller shareholders (Bae, Kang, & Kim, 2002; Bertrand,
Mehta, & Mullainathan, 2002). This phenomenon is generally known as “tunneling,”
and is commonly defined as “the transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the
benefit of their controlling shareholders” (Johnson, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, &
Shleifer, 2000: 22). Whereas tunneling can occur at all times, it is especially common
in times of economic or financial crisis. During crises, corporate wealth is siphoned off
by controlling shareholders to escape their own creditors, while better-performing
firms are called upon by their underperforming affiliates to “bail them out”
(Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002; Granovetter, 2005). In general, tunneling is easier
when the dominant shareholder is also a director of the firm. In such cases, the intent
to disadvantage minority shareholders goes hand-in-hand with the legal authority to
make executive decisions on corporate transactions, thereby creating a vicious
conjunction of shareholder–manager and shareholder–shareholder agency problems.
In practice, tunneling can take either one of three forms. First, controlling
shareholders can transfer resources from the focal firm to other firms they own through
self-dealing or related party transactions (Djankov et al., 2008). Commonly, this
happens through the use of artificially deflated transfer prices (Johnson et al., 2000) or
by means of acquisitions which hurt the focal firm but benefit affiliated firms (Bae
et al., 2002). Second, the controlling shareholder can increase his or her share of the
firm without transferring any assets, through minority-disadvantaging transactions
such as dilutive share issues or minority freeze-outs (Johnson et al., 2000). Third,
controlling shareholders who are also directors of the firms can expropriate minority
shareholders by setting their own compensation at above-market levels unjustified by
performance or effort (Cheung, Stouraitis, & Wong, 2005). Regardless of form,
therefore, tunneling will have detrimental effects on corporate performance. See
Hypothesis 1b:
Hypothesis 1b In Asia, ownership concentration is negatively related to corporate
performance.
Nonmonotonic effects of concentrated ownership A recent meta-analysis of the
influence of concentrated ownership on firm performance found that its two focal
variables were not connected by a statistically significant relationship (Dalton, Daily,
Meta-analyzing ownership concentration and firm performance in Asia 485
Certo, & Roengpitya, 2003). These findings therefore indicate that in the aggregate
the costs and benefits of concentrated ownership may very well cancel each other
out. This does not imply that concentrated ownership is inconsequential in all
individual cases. There is some evidence suggesting that that the effects of
ownership structure on performance are nonmonotonic (Demsetz & Villalonga,
2001; Morck et al., 1988; McConnell & Servaes, 1990), and that they vary with the
size of the concentrated owner_s stake. When a concentrated owner_s stake is
relatively low, the owner has insufficient control to successfully engage in tunneling
or other minority-disadvantaging strategies. Under these conditions, the concentrated
owner_s most effective strategy for increasing his or her private wealth is to push the
management of the firm for greater performance. Hence relatively low levels of
concentrated ownership will have an overall positive influence on corporate
performance. At higher levels of ownership, however, a point will be reached
where the concentrated owner effectively controls the firm, while there is still a
significant fraction of small investors to expropriate. Under these conditions
tunneling is both feasible and lucrative, and the effect of concentrated ownership
on corporate performance will cease to be positive. Since in many jurisdictions
dominant shareholders can have control rights in excess of their ownership rights (La
Porta et al., 1999), tunneling often becomes a real possibility even with ownership
stakes well below 50%. However, as the concentrated ownership stake increases
further, tunneling becomes a less sensible strategy for increasing private wealth, as
there will be fewer minority shareholders to expropriate. Tunneling would then
simply result in a direct transfer of private wealth from one venture into another,
which is unlikely to benefit the concentrated owner, except perhaps for fiscal
reasons. As the best strategy for majority owners to increase their private wealth is to
gear the firm for higher performance, very large ownership stakes are again likely to
have a positive effect on firm performance. Previous research by Morck et al. (1988)
has reported a similarly shaped (positive/neutral/positive) nonmonotonic relationship
between the degree of ownership concentration and firm profitability. See
Hypothesis 1c:
Hypothesis 1c In Asia, the relationship between ownership concentration and
corporate performance will follow a nonmonotonic (positive/neutral/positive) pattern.
The identity of concentrated owners
Our second research question was: Does the identity of the concentrated owner
matter to the performance of Asian firms? This question dovetails with the emerging
insight that different categories of concentrated owners may have different
preferences and priorities with respect to corporate risk, stability, growth, and
performance (Douma et al., 2006; Gedajlovic et al., 2005). These differences are
likely to moderate the relationship between ownership concentration and perfor-
mance. Quite a number of classifications pertaining to the identity of corporate
owners have been suggested in the literature, but it is beyond the objectives of this
paper to discuss them in great detail. Instead, we will focus on two influential
categorizations: (1) foreign versus domestic owners (Douma et al., 2006) and (2)
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stable, versus market, versus inside owners (Gedajlovic et al., 2005; Gerlach, 1992).
Specifically, we explore whether these identity-based classifications influence the
associational strength of our focal relationship.
Foreign versus domestic owners Corporate governance scholars commonly distin-
guish between foreign and domestic concentrated owners (e.g., Douma et al., 2006).
It is generally argued that foreign owners expect and effectuate higher performance
than domestic owners. Foreign owners tend to contribute positively to firm
performance for two reasons. First, they often contribute to organizational and
managerial capabilities by providing knowledge and organizational resources in
addition to the financial capital they provide. Chibber and Majumdar (1999), for
example, found that foreign owners tend to commit more resources to knowledge
transfer. Similarly, Djankov and Hoekman (2000) found that foreign owners provide
companies with generic knowledge like managerial expertise and quality control
systems. Second, foreign owners may select for, or contribute to the realization of,
good governance practices in the firms they invest in. As foreign owners often own
similar firms in different jurisdictions, they tend to have the relevant experience and
know-how to set appropriate benchmarks for governance and performance (Douma
et al., 2006). Furthermore, experience with corporate governance “best practices” in
their home markets often makes it easier for them to select control strategies which
align managers_ interests with their own. In sum, firms tend to earn positive
performance benefits from foreign ownership.
In contrast, domestic ownership in Asia tends to be associated with lower
performance. Many domestic owners involve business groups of some sort, that is:
“sets of legally separate firms bound together in persistent formal and/or informal
ways” (Granovetter, 2005: 429). Although the effect of group ownership on
performance differs somewhat across countries (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001), there are
two features of group ownership that tend to have a negative effect on firms_
performance in the Asian context. First, many groups have a strong joint identity
based on common brands or because they are dominantly owned by a single family
(Granovetter, 2005). This instills obligations of inter-firm loyalty in them which
make them susceptible to the practice of inefficiently transferring wealth and
resources from more profitable firms to other firms in the group that are temporarily
or structurally financially constrained (Shin & Park, 1999). Second, as hinted at
before, group structures create opportunities for tunneling, due to the presence of
pyramidal control structures and extensive cross-holdings (Bebchuk, Kraakman, &
Trianis, 2000; Bertrand et al., 2002; Johnson et al., 2000). In short, firms owned by
domestic parties tend to be outperformed by firms owned by foreign parties. See
Hypothesis 2a:
Hypothesis 2a The association between concentrated ownership and firm perfor-
mance in Asian countries will be more strongly positive when the concentrated
owner is foreign, as opposed to domestic.
Stable, market, and inside owners In addition to geographical classifications,
controlling parties can also be characterized in terms of the motivations and
objectives that pertain to their share ownership (Gedajlovic et al., 2005). An
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influential typology was suggested by Gerlach (1992), who distinguishes between
“stable,” “inside,” and “market” owners. Each of these groups tends to have distinct
investment objectives, which we expect to result in differential performance.
Stable investors typically involve parties like affiliated firms, banks, and
insurance companies. Characteristic for these investors is that they tend to have
multiple ties with the firms in which they own shares. In addition to being
shareholders, stable investors are often also creditors, debtors, buyers, suppliers, or
alliance partners. Their equity stake primarily serves to cement an often complex set
of non-shareholder relationships with the focal firm, and is often reciprocated to
create cross-holdings (Roe, 1994). Due to such relational multiplicity, profitability
objectives are typically only a secondary consideration for stable investors
(Abegglen & Stalk, 1985; Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002), while also making them
highly sensitive to pressures from the focal firm_s management (Brickley, Lease, &
Smith, 1988; David, Kochhar, & Levitas, 1998).
Inside investors are individuals or groups who combine a substantial equity stake
with direct managerial control over the firm (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Although inside
owners can be professional managers who have been endowed with a substantial
ownership stake in order to align their interests with those of outside owners, in Asia
they tend to consist of corporate founders and their immediate families. Although
insiders_ shareholdings entitle them to a share in the firm_s profit stream (Alchian &
Demsetz, 1972), inside owners often do not adopt policies that contribute to the
attainment of the highest possible profits for three reasons. First, since inside owners
have often locked up a large part of their wealth in the firms they dominantly own,
they are suboptimally diversified and hence will be more risk-aversive than more
diversified investors (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Their risk-aversion is likely to put
pressure on the firm_s profit-generating potential. Second, inside owners often
appoint family members rather than external professional managers in key
managerial positions (Granovetter, 2005). Insiders make such appointment decisions
because they trust relatives more than outsiders or because they simply want to
benefit their next of kin (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001).
Unfortunately, handing over control to individuals lacking managerial experience
or even talent usually does not cohere very well with the aim of profit maximization.
Third, as explained earlier, the combination of having a group of minority
shareholders to exploit and enjoying full-fledged executive powers over the
corporation may create opportunities for tunneling that only few inside owners will
be able to resist.
Market investors are different from inside and stable investors in that they are
typically tied to the firm only with their equity stakes and mostly operate at arm_s
length from firm management. Market investors thus tend to have maximal equity
returns as their primary investment objective (Fukao, 1999). Corporations may be
sensitive to the pressures of market investors for two reasons. First, market investors
will be less than hesitant to sell their ownership stake when they are dissatisfied with
the firm_s share performance. This is a powerful disciplining force, since selling-off
large blocks of shares is likely to lower the firm_s share price and thus increases its
cost of equity capital (La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000b).
Second, market investors will factor in a risk premium when they fear problems like
tunneling or managerial entrenchment—again increasing the firm_s cost of equity
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capital. These disciplinary forces make it more likely that the firm_s managers will
engage in strategies consistent with market investors_ investment objectives. In sum,
we expect that firms owned by market investors will outperform firms owned by
either inside or stable investors. See Hypothesis 2b:
Hypothesis 2b The association between concentrated ownership and firm perfor-
mance in Asian countries will be more strongly positive when the concentrated
owner is a market investor, as opposed to an inside or stable investor.
A common critique of the ownership-performance literature, which potentially
undermines the logic behind Hypotheses 2a and 2b, is that corporate ownership is an
endogenous variable rather than an exogenous influence on firm profitability
(Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). In the words of Demsetz and Villalonga: “the ownership
structure of a corporation should be thought of as an endogenous outcome of
decisions that reflect the influence of shareholders and of trading on the market for
shares” (2001: 210). Most crucial in this respect are the monitoring needs of the
firm: when the performance of the firm is more likely to fluctuate due to self-serving
managerial behaviors, it is better managed by concentrated owners; when
performance is more predictable it is also safe in the hands of dispersed shareholders
(Davis, 2005). As an equilibrium outcome, therefore, the effect of ownership on
performance is likely to be null (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001).
Although the endogeneity critique is elegant and compelling, its validity is
critically dependent on the liquidity and informational efficiency of the underlying
stock market. Ownership is likely to be endogenous when shareholders have
sufficient information about the future (behavioral) performance variability of the
companies in which they invest, and when they can costlessly adjust the size of their
shareholdings in each accordingly. Very few, if any, stock markets in Asia meet these
criteria. Prior research has demonstrated that ownership in Asia is remarkably stable,
probably due to the fact that the restructuring of ownership is costly and difficult in
illiquid and informationally opaque markets (Douma et al., 2006; Selarka, 2005). In
such markets ownership can be treated as an exogenous variable, as investors can
neither acquire nor divest controlling blocks without incurring significant costs, and
must therefore seek to maximize the performance of corporations given the block of
shares they own in them (Stiglitz, 1994). In other words, the Asian context allows us
to sidestep the endogeneity critique of the ownership literature.
Country-level moderating effects
The third research question we raised was: Is the relationship between ownership
concentration and firm performance in Asia moderated by jurisdiction-level
institutions? The intuition behind this research question rests on the observation
that nation-states have very different institutional configurations as a result of
historically different development trajectories (Hollingsworth & Boyer, 1997).
Rather than converging into a single “most efficient” capitalist system, these largely
idiosyncratic development trajectories have culminated in geo-political “patchworks”
in which several “varieties of capitalism” (Hall & Soskice, 2001) tend to durably co-
exist (Heugens & Otten, 2007). Country-level institutions play a large role in
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economic development, as they provide for (social) peace, assure individual freedoms
to make investment and purchasing decisions, establish secure and transferable
property rights, and enforce contracts through their legal systems (North, 1990). The
crucial point, however, is that national systems will provide for these capitalist support
functions by means of different institutional configurations. These “social institutions
of capitalism” (Heugens, 2007; Heugens, van Oosterhout, & Vromen, 2003) tend to
vary considerably internationally, which makes the relationship between ownership
concentration and profitability likely to vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (Aguilera
& Jackson, 2003; Hollingsworth & Boyer, 1997). In the present paper, we will focus
on three crucial jurisdiction-level moderating variables: (1) the overall quality of a
nation_s background institutions; (2) the level of de jure protection a country offers its
shareholders against self-dealing by corporate executives (Djankov et al., 2008); and
(3) the de facto private benefits a country allows parties to extract from the firms they
dominantly own (Dyck & Zingales, 2004).
Quality of background institutions Although large investors may induce managers to
work in their interest by way of the direct, informal access they might enjoy, this
influence strategy only works when the relationship between owner and manager is
fairly amicable. In most other situations, large shareholders can ultimately govern
only by exercising their voting rights. Voting, however, is a relatively inefficient
(Easterbrook & Fishel, 1991) and often ineffective governance mechanism
(Bebchuk, 2007). In any case, the effectiveness of voting is critically dependent
upon the quality of the legal system and other background institutions (Shleifer &
Vishny, 1997). Majority ownership requires relatively little judicial intervention, as a
51% ownership stake is both easy to prove and provides a straightforward “unity of
command” (David et al., 2007) that clarifies decision making. Things are
considerably more complicated for large minority shareholders, however, as they
need to make alliances with other investors to exercise control. Because managers
can much more easily interfere in these alliances, the need for judicial intervention to
enforce shareholder control becomes considerably higher. As a consequence, “large
minority share holdings may be effective only in countries with relatively
sophisticated legal systems” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997: 755). In brief, the quality
of a given nation_s background institutions (especially but not exclusively its legal
system) will influence the associational strength of the relationship between
concentrated ownership and performance. See Hypothesis 3a:
Hypothesis 3a The association between concentrated ownership and firm perfor-
mance is positively moderated by the quality of the background institutions of the
firm_s home country.
Legal protection against self-dealing In the Asian context, where so many firms
have dominant owners (Claessens, Djankov, & Klapper, 2003; La Porta et al., 1999),
minority shareholders have every reason to be more concerned about expropriation
by larger shareholders than about the detrimental effects of managerial opportunism.
As explained before, they have recourse to two broad governance strategies to
remedy such inter-shareholder governance problems: concentrating their ownership
in order to become dominant owners themselves or investing only in jurisdictions in
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which a sophisticated legal system offers them sufficient protection against
controlling shareholders.
There are two ways in which concentrated ownership and legal protection can
relate to each other within a corporate governance regime. First, legal protection and
concentrated ownership may be mutually supportive within the configuration of
institutional features that constitutes a corporate governance regime. In this view,
legal protection and concentrated ownership are complementary institutions (Aoki,
2001: 87ff), and we should expect a positive interaction effect of the joint presence
of these two features on corporate performance. But concentrated ownership and
legal protection, second, can also be substitutes rather than complements (Shleifer &
Vishny, 1997). Under this scenario, the presence of one of these features in a
corporate governance regime is necessary to ensure satisfactory corporate perfor-
mance, but the addition of the second feature will add little or nothing to that
performance. In other words, there will be no positive interaction effect of the two
features under conditions of substitution.
The Asian context allows for a concurrent test of these two alternatives. In certain
Asian jurisdictions the legal protection against self-dealing transactions is relatively
poorly developed. India, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan provide cases in
point (Djankov et al., 2006). In these countries ownership concentration is likely to be
an effective substitute for legal protection. By consolidating their interests, investors
can prevent expropriation, thus strengthening the association between ownership and
performance. Things are different, however, in countries in which shareholders enjoy
excellent legal protection. In this study, exemplary countries are Hong Kong,
Singapore, and Malaysia (Djankov et al., 2008). In these countries, concentrated
owners enjoy little if any special powers over corporate directors and officers, as
shareholder interests are firmly protected by relevant laws and an effective judiciary.
Under these conditions, concentrated ownership is a redundant corporate governance
feature at best. Hence we expect the association between ownership concentration and
firm performance to be weaker in the presence of adequate legal protection, due to
both the former_s redundancy as a governance mechanism and the potential costs of
concentrated ownership (see below). Hence Hypothesis 3b:
Hypothesis 3b The association between concentrated ownership and firm perfor-
mance is negatively moderated by the level of legal protection against self-dealing
offered by the firm_s home country.
Private benefits of control At its core, the field of corporate governance deals with
the distribution of corporate residuals (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Although a
perfectly efficient corporate governance regime would distribute the corporate
residual over all shareholders in proportion to their economic ownership (La Porta
et al., 1999), many existing corporate governance regimes allow for some private
benefits of control, that is, a proportion of the residual that is not shared among all
shareholders but that is enjoyed exclusively by a controlling shareholder (Dyck &
Zingales, 2004). It is important to note that these private benefits are de facto
benefits, which may be obtained in spite of a high level of de jure protection against
self-dealing. In some Asian countries, de jure protection clauses can effectively be
circumvented by dominant shareholders through corruption or because these
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countries simply lack the capacity to monitor corporate governance and police white
collar crime (Claessens & Fan, 2002).
Asian countries that approach the ideal of a highly efficient corporate governance
regime include Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan (Dyck & Zingales, 2004),
as the private benefits of control in these nations are practically zero. In these
contexts, the association between concentrated ownership and firm performance is
likely to be stronger (everything else being equal), because there exist fewer
opportunities for tunneling practices by those in control (Bertrand et al., 2002;
Johnson et al., 2000).2 In contrast, the governance regimes of other Asian nations
offer controlling shareholders ample opportunities to “take the money and run”
(Djankov et al., 2008: 2). Countries in which minority shareholders are consistently
expropriated include Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand (Dyck & Zingales, 2004).
Here, the strength of the relationship between concentrated ownership and firm
performance is likely to be weaker because controlling shareholders are more likely
to succeed in siphoning off corporate wealth into private coffers. See Hypothesis 3c:
Hypothesis 3c The association between concentrated ownership and firm perfor-
mance is negatively moderated by the level of private benefits the concentrated
owner is allowed to reap by the corporate governance system of the firm_s home
country.
Methods
Methodological overview
We used two groups of meta-analytical procedures to test our Hypotheses. For
Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, 2a, and 2b, we used Hedges and Olkin-type meta-analyses
(HOMA; Hedges & Olkin, 1985). In HOMA there are two methods for combining
study estimates. The first method utilizes a fixed effects model, which assumes the
absence of heterogeneity between study results. In fixed effects HOMA, the
collected effect sizes are solely corrected for sampling error, under the assumption
that differences in sample size are the sole driver of variability between effect sizes.
The second method employs random effects models, and is currently favored by the
meta-analytic community (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Kisamore & Brannick, 2008).
Attractively, random effects HOMA is more conservative than fixed effects HOMA
when effect size distributions are heterogeneous, but both methods yield materially
similar results when the distribution is homogeneous (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). The
random effects method assumes that studies are estimating different effect sizes,
which are corrected for sampling error plus a value that represents other sources of
2 Note that the absence of private benefits of control in countries with strong legal protection of (minority)
shareholders may lead to an absolute undersupply of ownership concentration nevertheless, as private
benefits of control are an incentive for owners to concentrate their ownership that at least partially offsets
its costs (e.g., suboptimal diversification, a lack of liquidity).
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variability, which are in turn assumed to be randomly distributed. In short, we opt for
random effect HOMA.
In recent years, so-called artifact-corrected meta-analytic methods (ACMA;
Hunter & Schmidt, 2004) have become more popular than HOMA, especially in
psychology and in the management sciences (Eden, 2002). In ACMA, effect sizes
are corrected for a much broader array of statistical artifacts, including measurement
error, dichotomization, and range restriction. However, since practically all studies in
the field of corporate governance are based on independently verifiable economic
data rather than on self-reported psychometric data, random effects HOMA is the
more appropriate choice for estimating mean effect sizes (Rosenthal, 1991).
To test Hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c, we used meta-analytic regression analyses
(MARA; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). MARA is a special type of weighted least squares
(WLS) regression analysis, which is designed specifically to assess the relationship
between effect size and moderator variables in order to model previously unexplored
heterogeneity in the effect size distribution (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). One of the
unique benefits of MARA is that it allows for the modeling of such heterogeneity
with the help of data that were not part of the primary studies involved. In our case,
we collected additional country-level institutional variables to explain heterogeneity
across effect sizes.
Sample and coding
To identify the population of studies that report on the relationship between ownership
concentration and firm performance in Asia, we used a set of complementary search
strategies, through which we systematically explored both published and unpublished
sources. A combinatory search strategy, through which working papers and articles that
have previously appeared in books or journals are explored in tandem, improves the
scope and validity of a meta-analysis in two ways. First, a combined search maximizes
the number of useful studies included in the analysis and therefore minimizes the odds of
“missing a useful paper that lies outside one_s regular purview” (White, 1994: 44).
Second, it helps to overcome the confirmatory bias towards which every meta-analysis
drawing on exclusively published sources is prone. In Pfeffer_s words: “published
results are systematically biased in favor of those showing predicted effects, which in
turn means that meta-analyses, which invariably rely mostly if not exclusively on
published studies, can easily overestimate actual effect sizes” (2007: 1338). Exploring
and including working papers helps alleviate this concern.
In all, we used four different search strategies to uncover relevant published and
unpublished works. First, we read several prior review articles (e.g., Becht, Bolton, &
Roell, 2005; Gadhoum, Noiseux, & Zeghal 2005; Holderness, 2003) and one meta-
analysis focusing on the relationship between equity holdings and firm performance in
the United States (Dalton et al., 2003). Second, we examined five electronic databases:
(1) ABI/INFORM Global, (2) EconLit, (3) Google Scholar, (4) JSTOR, and (5)
SSRN, using the following search terms: “blockholder,” “equity,” “insider ownership,”
“institutional ownership,” “outside ownership,” “ownership,” and “shareholders.”
Third, we conducted a manual search of the most relevant journals in the accounting,
economics, finance, and management fields. Illustrative examples include: Academy of
Management Journal; Corporate Governance: An International Review; Journal of
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Business Finance & Accounting; Journal of Comparative Economics; Journal of
Corporate Finance; Journal of Finance; and Strategic Management Journal. Fourth,
upon collecting an initial set of studies, we used the “snowballing” technique in that
we searched reference lists for previously unidentified relevant papers. These four
strategies yielded a final sample consisting of 290 effect sizes derived from 65 primary
studies. In turn, these studies consisted of 49 journal articles, 15 unpublished working
papers, and 1 PhD thesis.
We proceeded by reading all articles in the final set and by developing a coding
protocol (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001) for extracting data on all relevant variables. To test
Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c, we collected information on effect sizes and sample sizes.
To test Hypotheses 2a and 2b, we additionally differentiated between “domestic” and
“foreign” owners, and classified owners alternatively as “inside,” “market,” or “stable”
investors. Table 1 summarizes definitions for all variables included in this study.
HOMA procedure
The effect size statistic we used for the HOMA is the Pearson product-moment
correlation r. This correlation coefficient is an easily interpretable and scale free
measure. In case studies reporting different effect size statistics, such as Cohen_s
standardized means difference measure d, we converted them back into an r value
using the appropriate formulas (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). HOMA procedures assume
that effect sizes are normally distributed. However, when the underlying (or true)
population value of r differs substantially from zero, the effect size distribution tends
to become skewed (Rosenthal, 1991), which complicates the comparison and
combining of results. A common remedy to this problem is to apply Fisher_s (1928)
Zr transformation to the data, to bring them closer to the normal distribution (Hedges
& Olkin, 1985). In our HOMA we therefore used Fisher_s Zr transformed
correlations.3
An important question in HOMA is how to deal with studies that contain multiple
measurements of the focal effect (Bijmolt & Pieters, 2001). In our study, multiple
measurements of the concentrated ownership—financial performance relationship
are often reported due to different simultaneous operationalizations of ownership
(e.g., different cut-off points of concentrated ownership) or performance (e.g., both
market- and accounting-based measured of performance). At stake is the trade-off
between on the one hand stochastic independence of the various effect sizes in the
analysis and on the other the use of all available information. A Monte Carlo
simulation by Bijmolt and Pieters (2001) shows that procedures using the complete
set of measurements outperform those representing each study by only a single value
(such as a single best indicator or a composite measure) in areas like parameter
significance testing and parameter estimation accuracy. We therefore decided to
include all available measurements in our study.
To arrive at an appropriate estimate of the meta-analytic mean, we have to
account for differences in precision across effect sizes, as well as for variability in
the population of effects. These differences derive from differences in the sample
3 Fisher’s Zr transformed correlations are calculated as follows: zr ¼ 12 ln 1þr1r
 
, where r is the untrans-
formed correlation coefficient.
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Table 1 Description of variables.
Variable Description
Ownership concentration A measure of the degree to which ownership in the firm is
concentrated in the hands of a single investor; concentrated
ownership refers both to substantial minority shareholders as
well as to large shareholders enjoying outright control over
the firm. Common cut-off points above which ownership
is seen as (highly) concentrated are 10% and 20% ownership
levels respectively (La Porta et al., 1999)
Domestic owner A variable which assumes a positive value (either “1” in case
of dummy operationalizations or a percentage in case
the degree of ownership concentration is known) when the
dominant owner is a domestic party (e.g., a domestic firm,
financial institution, business group, or other; see for instance
Douma et al., 2006).
Foreign owner A variable which assumes a positive value (either “1” in case
of dummy operationalizations or a percentage in case the
degree of ownership concentration is known) when the
dominant owner is a foreign party (e.g., a foreign firm,
financial institution, business group, or other; see for
instance Douma et al., 2006).
Inside investor A variable which assumes a positive value (either “1”
in case of dummy operationalizations or a percentage in
case the degree of ownership concentration is known)
when the dominant owner is an insider in the firm
(e.g., managers, founders, and their immediate family
members; see for instance Gedajlovic et al., 2005).
Market investor A variable which assumes a positive value (either “1”
in case of dummy operationalizations or a percentage
in case the degree of ownership concentration is known)
when the dominant owner is solely tied to the firm via an
arm's length equity stake (e.g., foreign shareholders, pension
funds, and investment trusts; see for instance
Gedajlovic et al., 2005).
Stable investor A variable which assumes a positive value (either “1”
in case of dummy operationalizations or a percentage
in case the degree of ownership concentration is known)
when the dominant owner is durably tied to the firm via
multiple business ties over and above the equity tie
(e.g., banks, business partners, or firms that are a member
in the same business group; see for instance
Gedajlovic et al., 2005).
Accounting performance Any indicator of the financial performance of the firm
that is expressed in the form of an accounting-based
measure of firm profits (ROA, ROE, ROS, ROI,
EPS, and PM).
Market performance Any indicator of the financial performance of the firm
that is expressed in the form of a market-based measure
of firm value (stock returns, market-to-book ratio, Tobin’s Q).
Rule of law A variable which measures the extent to which agents have
confidence in and abide by the rules of society in 2002.
These include perceptions of the incidence of violent and
non-violent crime, the effectiveness and predictability
of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts
(Kaufmann et al., 2005).
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sizes of the underlying primary studies on which the effect sizes are based, and from
a constant term that represents the variability across the population effects. Hedges
and Olkin (1985) demonstrated that the optimal measure of precision for a given
effect size is the inverse variance weight w: the inverse of the squared standard error
value of the effect size.4 With the help of these weights, we can subsequently
Table 1 (continued).
Variable Description
Anti-self-dealing index A variable which measures the extent to which national
jurisdictions offer minority shareholders protection against
expropriation by controlling shareholders, expressed
in the form of a zero (low protection) to one
(high protection) index. The index includes ex-ante
and ex-post controls around self-dealing transactions
(Djankov et al., 2008).
Private benefits of control index A variable which measures the excess value (over and
above the market value) of a controlling block of shares
as measured in an exchange transaction. This excess value,
which is paid in the form of a “block premium,” captures
the discounted future cash flows the acquirer expects to
expropriate from minority shareholders. The block premium
is computed by taking the difference between the price per
share paid for the control block and the exchange price
2 days after the announcement of the control transaction,
dividing by the exchange price and multiplying by the ratio
of the proportion of cash flow rights represented in the
controlling block (Dyck & Zingales, 2004).
Publication year For journal articles: year in which the article first appeared
in print. For working papers: year in which the paper was
first included in a publicly accessible working paper series.
Published A dummy variable measuring whether a specific study was
published in a scholarly peer reviewed journal (1) or not (0).
Cross-sectional design A dummy variable measuring whether the data included
in a specific study was based on a cross-sectional (1) or
a longitudinal (0) observation plan.
Ln GDP/capita Natural log of per capita gross domestic product in
2003 US dollars (World Development Indicators
at: http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/).
Stock market capitalization/GDP Average of the ratio of stock market capitalization
to gross domestic product for the period 1999–2003
(World Development Indicators at: http://devdata.worldbank.org/
dataonline/).
4 w is calculated as follows: wi ¼ 1se2i þ v^q , where SE is the standard error of the effect size and bvq is the
random effects variance component., which is in turn calculated as: s:e: zrð Þ ¼ 1ffiffiffiffiffiffin3p , and the formula for
random effect variance is: bvq ¼ QTk1P
w
P
w
2P
w
 
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calculate the meta-analytic mean effect size, its standard error, and the corresponding
confidence interval.5
MARA procedure
Variables We used MARA to test Hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c. To measure the overall
quality of the background institutions in the various Asian jurisdictions in our
sample (cf. Hypothesis 3a), we used Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi_s (2005) oft-
used “rule of law” measure. We assessed the jurisdictional level of legal protection
against self-dealing (cf. Hypothesis 3b) with Djankov et al._s (2008) “anti-self-
dealing index.” To estimate the realized benefits of corporate control in Asia (cf.
Hypothesis 3c), we used Dyck and Zingales_ (2004) “private benefits of control
index.” We furthermore assessed the influence of three additional methodological
moderator variables, to assess whether the observed heterogeneity in the effect size
distribution was an artifact of differences in study design and status. Specifically, we
assessed whether a particular effect size was derived from: (1) a recent or an older
study; (2) from a published or unpublished study; and (3) a study using a cross-
sectional or a longitudinal observation plan. Finally, we used two control variables to
account for any spurious differences in economic development across the nations in
our sample: (1) gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, and (2) stock-market
capitalization as a fraction of GDP. All variables are summarily described in Table 1.
Analysis We used WLS regression analysis to assess the relationship between effect
size and moderator variables (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). We use weighted regression
to account for differences in precision across the effect sizes included in our study.
Research by Hedges (Hedges, 1982; Hedges & Olkin, 1985) shows that the optimal
weight to be used in MARA is again the inverse variance weight w. We had to rely
on a modified type of WLS, because most statistical analysis programs will provide
correct estimates of the regression coefficients, but report incorrect standard errors
and significance levels for MARA. This is the case when the software interprets the
inverse variance weights as “representing multiple effect sizes rather than weightings
of single effect sizes and attributes an exaggerated n to the effect size sample”
(Lipsey & Wilson, 2001: 122). Fortunately, this problem is easy to correct. Hedges
and Olkin (1985) demonstrated that a correct standard error can be computed for the
unstandardized regression coefficients using the incorrect standard error and the
mean-square residual. A significance test (z-test) can then be conducted by dividing
the unstandardized regression coefficient by its corrected standard error (Lipsey &
Wilson, 2001). We use these modifications in the analysis presented here.
Meta-analysts have to choose between two estimation options when modeling
between-study effect size differences through MARA. The first is to opt for a fixed
effects model, in which it is assumed that all between-study differences can wholly
5 The meta-analytic mean is calculated as follows: ES ¼
P
wESð ÞP
w
, with its standard error: seES ¼ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1P
w
q
, and with its 95% confidence interval computed as: Lower ¼ ES  1:96 seES
 
, Upper ¼
ES þ 1:96 seES
 
.
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be attributed to systematic variance (captured by modeled moderator variables) and
subject-level sampling error (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). But effect size distributions
may remain heterogeneous even after modeling for between-study differences. A
second option is then to use a mixed-effects model, in which variability in the effect
size distribution is again attributed to systematic between-study differences and
subject-level sampling error, but in which there is also a remaining unmeasured or
even immeasurable random component (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). Fixed effects
models have more statistical power, but also higher Type I error rates, whereas both
statistical power and Type I error rates are lower for mixed-effects models. Since the
meta-analysis community is becoming increasingly concerned about the inaccuracy
of fixed effects models (personal correspondence with David Wilson), however, we
have opted for a more conservative mixed effects specification.
Results
Hypothesis testing
Table 2 reports the HOMA results pertaining to Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, 2a, and 2b.
Hypothesis 1b is rejected in favor of Hypothesis 1a: the mean rho of the relationship
between ownership concentration and firm performance is .04 (k=290) and the
confidence interval does not include zero (which implies that the effect is
significant). This effect is independent of the chosen performance variable, as the
Table 2 Meta-analytic results for the ownership concentration–firm performance relationship.
Predictor K N Mean SDρ CI 95%
Ownership concentration to performance 290 660,087 0.04 0.01 0.03/0.05
Accounting measures 206 546,766 0.05 0.01 0.03/0.06
Market measures 84 113,321 0.04 0.01 0.01/0.06
Domestic owners to performance 128 341,991 0.02 0.01 0.01/0.04
Accounting measures 89 271,744 0.02 0.01 0.01/0.04
Market measures 39 70,247 0.02 0.02 −0.02/0.06
Foreign owners to performance 46 49,474 0.15 0.02 0.11/0.19
Accounting measures 32 35,790 0.17 0.02 0.12/0.21
Market measures 14 13,684 0.12 0.03 0.06/0.17
Market owners to performance 67 68,957 0.13 0.01 0.10/0.16
Accounting measures 48 49,753 0.14 0.02 0.10/0.17
Market measures 19 19,204 0.10 0.02 0.05/0.15
Stable owners to performance 90 346,066 0.01 0.01 −0.00/0.02
Accounting measures 70 302,715 0.01 0.01 −0.00/0.03
Market measures 20 43,351 −0.00 0.01 −0.03/0.03
Inside owners to performance 81 117,874 0.04 0.01 0.02/0.07
Accounting measures 53 93,911 0.04 0.01 0.03/0.06
Market measures 28 23,963 0.03 0.04 −0.05/0.11
Ownership concentration to performance
0% to 10% 62 132,754 0.09 0.01 0.06/0.11
10% to 25% 60 42,295 0.07 0.02 0.03/0.11
25% to 50% 47 177,402 0.00 0.01 −0.02/0.03
50% to 100% 3 5,326 0.04 0.05 −0.05/0.14
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difference between market- and accounting-based measures of performance is
negligible. In short: in the Asian context, ownership concentration enhances
corporate performance.
This finding needs to be nuanced in two ways, however. First, the mean effect size we
found is small by conventional standards (Cohen, 1977). In other words, ownership
concentration improves corporate performance in Asia, but certainly not drastically.
Second, and more importantly, the associational strength of the relationship between
ownership concentration and corporate performance varies significantly across
contexts. Cochran_s (1954) Q test, the most common test to assess whether there is
true heterogeneity in a meta-analysis, is highly significant (Q=4301.22; p<0.001).6
Table 3 reports the country-specific HOMA results. The results reported in
Table 2 derive from eleven Asian countries, but we were unable to identify a
sufficient number of studies from Indonesia and the Philippines to conduct country-
specific analyses. Of the remaining nine countries, the effect of ownership
concentration on performance was positive and significant in four cases: India,
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. In these contexts, concentrated ownership clearly
matters for performance, with the mean effect sizes for the focal relationship ranging
from .04 (Japan) to .12 (Taiwan). In four other nations—China, Malaysia, Singapore,
and Thailand—no significant performance effects of concentrated ownership could
be identified. In these countries, concentrated ownership does not bolster corporate
performance (Hong Kong is a boundary case, for which the focal effect is modest
(.02) and barely significant). Below, we will explore the institutional origins of these
differences.
Hypothesis 1c is confirmed. Even though in the aggregate the positive effects of
concentrated ownership on firm performance prevail in the Asian context, the effect is
not a monotonous function of the level of ownership. At lower levels of ownership,
where owners can influence managers but lack full control over the firm, the effect on
performance is relatively strong and significant (0%–10%: mean rho=.09; 10%–
25%: mean rho=.07). As the ownership stake increases (25%–50%), such that owners
can exert full control over the firm (usually with the help of pyramidal equity
schemes), the effect on performance becomes negligible (mean rho=.01) and
insignificant. We conjecture that at these intermediate levels of concentrated
ownership, the positive effects to firms of having a concentrated owner are offset
by increased opportunities for self-dealing (see also below). At even higher levels of
ownership (50%–100%) the effect on performance increases again (mean rho=.04),
but remains insignificant. In sum, performance is non-monotonically related to
ownership.
Hypothesis 2a is fully confirmed by the HOMA results, lending credence to the
emerging insight in the corporate governance literature that the identity of the
concentrated owner matters for corporate performance. Whereas the presence of a
domestic concentrated owner does not lead to marked improvements in terms of
performance (mean rho=.02), having a foreign concentrated owner “on board”
6 The Q test is computed by summing the squared deviations of each study’s effect estimate from the
overall effect estimate (Cochran, 1954). In this exercise, each study is weighted by its w. The Q test
assumes homogeneity, following a Chi-square distribution with k – 1 degrees of freedom (k = the number
of studies). When Q is significant, as it is in our case, the assumption of homogeneity is rejected.
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makes a considerable positive difference (mean rho=.15). Hypothesis 2b is also
confirmed, as market investors (mean rho=.13) strongly outperform stable (mean
rho=.01, n.s.) and inside (mean rho=.04) owners.
Again, the results for Hypothesis 2b are nuanced somewhat by the comparative
analysis (cf. Table 3). Of the seven countries for which we have sufficient data, the
pattern predicted by Hypothesis 2b is clearly found in five cases: India, Japan,
Malaysia, South Korea, and Taiwan. In two instances (notably, Hong Kong and
Singapore), however, no significant differences could be noted between the various
types of owners. We return to this issue in the discussion section of this paper, where
we shall offer an institutional explanation for these noted differences.
Table 4 shows the MARA results for Hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c. The model fits the
data reasonably well (R2=.22). More importantly, the homogeneity statistic Q is
significant for the modeled variance in effect sizes (p<.01), implying that the model
Table 3 Country-specific meta-analytic results.
Country Predictor K N Mean SDρ CI 95%
China Ownership to performance 33 87,488 0.02 0.02 −0.03/0.06
Market owners to performance – – – – –
Stable owners to performance 17 46,006 −0.03 0.02 −0.07/0.00
Inside owners to performance 9 9,168 0.10 0.10 −0.09/0.29
Hong Kong Ownership to performance 32 46,052 0.02 0.01 0.00/0.03
Market owners to performance 3 6,318 0.02 0.02 −0.02/0.07
Stable owners to performance 3 6,318 0.02 0.03 −0.04/0.07
Inside owners to performance 6 12,636 0.02 0.02 −0.01/0.05
India Ownership to performance 24 14,979 0.06 0.02 0.02/0.09
Market owners to performance 14 8,607 0.08 0.03 0.03/0.13
Stable owners to performance 4 342 −0.05 0.05 −0.15/0.06
Inside owners to performance 3 2,098 0.02 0.04 −0.06/0.09
Japan Ownership to performance 62 374,610 0.04 0.01 0.02/0.06
Market owners to performance 15 15,361 0.16 0.04 0.09/0.24
Stable owners to performance 24 233,016 0.02 0.01 −0.01/0.04
Inside owners to performance 4 47,206 0.04 0.03 −0.01/0.09
Malaysia Ownership to performance 11 9,943 0.02 0.03 −0.03/0.07
Market owners to performance 2 292 0.19 0.06 0.08/0.31
Stable owners to performance – – – – –
Inside owners to performance 5 6,095 −0.05 0.03 −0.11/0.01
Singapore Ownership to performance 21 51,590 0.01 0.01 −0.01/0.04
Market owners to performance 6 11,430 −0.00 0.02 −0.05/0.03
Stable owners to performance 8 11,746 0.03 0.02 0.00/0.07
Inside owners to performance 4 532 −0.06 0.04 −0.15/0.02
South Korea Ownership to performance 53 41,674 0.06 0.01 0.04/0.08
Market owners to performance 17 21,875 0.14 0.02 0.10/0.19
Stable owners to performance 14 34,771 0.03 0.01 0.00/0.05
Inside owners to performance 12 17,027 0.02 0.01 0.00/0.04
Taiwan Ownership to performance 37 13,182 0.12 0.02 0.08/0.16
Market owners to performance 7 1,230 0.27 0.03 0.22/0.33
Stable owners to performance 10 2,280 0.04 0.03 −0.02/0.10
Inside owners to performance 18 9,582 0.13 0.02 0.08/0.18
Thailand Ownership to performance 5 5,424 −0.02 0.05 −0.10/0.07
Market owners to performance – – – – –
Stable owners to performance – – – – –
Inside owners to performance – – – – –
500 P.P.M.A.R. Heugens et al.
adequately captures the heterogeneity present in the effect size distribution. The
insignificant Q value for the residual variance (p>.10) shows that the assumptions for
mixed-effects MARA are met and that there is no need for further moderator analysis
(Lipsey & Wilson, 2001).
The results confirm Hypothesis 3a. The overall quality of a given Asian nation_s
background institutions, as captured by the rule of law variable (Kaufmann et al., 2005),
positively moderates the relationship between concentrated ownership and firm
performance (p<.05). In other words, the effectiveness of ownership concentration as
a corporate governance strategy is to some degree contingent upon the overall quality of
the institutional matrix in a given jurisdiction (North, 1990; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).
Hence there can be seen to be institutional complementarity between the quality of a
nation_s background institutions as measured by the rule of law variable, on the one
hand, and the effectiveness of ownership concentration as one of two generic corporate
governance strategies, on the other. Hypothesis 3b is also confirmed. The degree of
protection against self-dealing transactions by directors a given jurisdiction offers to its
shareholders (Djankov et al., 2008) negatively moderates our focal relationship (p<.05).
In other words, within Asian corporate governance configurations, legal protection of
shareholders and concentrated ownership are substitutes rather than complements.
Finally, the results also confirm Hypothesis 3c. The extent to which private benefits of
control can de facto be enjoyed by controlling shareholders (Dyck & Zingales, 2004)7
negatively moderates the concentrated ownership—corporate performance relationship
(p<.05). Apparently, when jurisdictions adopt a lenient stance towards the expropriation
of minority shareholders by controlling parties, the potential gains of ownership
concentration as a generic corporate governance strategy are offset by the costs that
result from private benefits of control (Bertrand et al., 2002; Johnson et al., 2000).
7 Such de facto granted private benefits of control are not simply the inverse of the de jure restrictions on
self-dealing in a given Asian jurisdiction, as the rather modest bivariate correlation (-.30) between the anti-
self-dealing index (Djankov et al., 2008) and the private benefits of control index (Dyck & Zingales, 2004)
across the countries in our sample shows. This finding illustrates that the adoption of restrictions on self-
dealing, which are often “transplanted” into Asian legal systems from Western origins (La Porta et al.,
1998), need not lead to their actual implementation and enforcement.
Variable Model
Publication year 0.00 (0.00)
Published −0.20 (0.07)**
Cross-sectional design 0.02 (0.02)
Rule of law 0.74 (0.35)**
Anti-self-dealing index −1.43 (0.62)**
Private benefits of control −0.99 (0.31)**
Gross domestic product −0.54 (0.25)*
Stock market capitalization 0.00 (0.00)**
R2 0.2183
K 235
QModel (p) 46.60 (0.00)
QResidual (p) 166.88 (0.14)
V 0.00468
Table 4 Results of mixed
effects WLS regression.a
a Unstandardized regression
coefficients are presented for
study moderators and
substantive moderators with
standard errors in parentheses
k is the total number of effect sizes;
Q is the homogeneity statistic with
its probability in parentheses; v is
the random effects variance
component
*p<0.1
**p<0.05
***p<0.01
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Robustness checks and control variables
In order to assess the generalizability of our findings, we conducted two robustness
tests.8 First, we have to account for the fact that the Japanese economy is very large
relative to the other economies in the region, and that Japan has attracted a
disproportionate amount of attention by researchers. As a consequence, a significant
number of our harvested effect sizes (62 out of 290) and the majority of the
underlying observations (374,610 out of 660,087) derive from the Japanese context.
To assess whether the Japanese data points biased our research findings, we created a
separate dummy variable, coded as “1” in case a harvested effect size represented
Japanese data and “0” otherwise, and entered it in a separate MARA analysis. The
addition of this variable did not significantly affect our results: the model fit statistics
remained within the same order of magnitude, and all three hypothesized effects
remained significant. In combination with the finding that the overall effect of
concentrated ownership on performance is exactly the same for Japan (.04; see
Table 3) as for our sample in its entirety (.04; see Table 2), we can conclude that the
preponderance of Japanese data did not bias our results.
Second, during the window of observation that is covered in our study, the Asian
region was in considerable flux. For example, GNP per capita went up rapidly in
many emerging economies, and several countries reformed their minority share-
holder protection regimes in the years following the 1997–1998 financial crisis (e.g.,
see Heugens & Otten, 2007). These temporal dynamics might possibly have affected
our findings, especially since some contributors have suggested that minority
shareholder expropriation is more prevalent during times of crisis than during
business-as-usual periods (Johnson et al., 2000). We therefore split our overall
sample of 290 effect sizes up in four sub-groups, notably: effect sizes covering the
pre-crisis period (1996 and before; 83 effects); the crisis period (1997 and 1998; 29
effects); the post-crisis period (1999 and after; 88 effects); and the “mixed” category
of studies covering two or more of these periods (90 effects). We then conducted a
separate HOMA analysis on each sub-group. All sub-group mean effect sizes did not
deviate significantly from the overall mean effect size. In other words, the
relationship between concentrated ownership and firm performance varies between
jurisdictions (see Table 3), but it is persistent over time.
Table 4 also reports the MARA results for our control variables. No significant
effect was found for publication year, implying that the results we found for our focal
relationship are stable over time. This corroborates the aforementioned sub-group
HOMA results. Interestingly, the published variable was strongly significant and
negative, which means that our results are unlikely to be affected by the most common
form of publication bias, notably: the retrieved effect size-increasing effect of
confirmatory publication bias (Pfeffer, 2007). The cross-sectional design variable
came out insignificant, implying that the choice between cross-sectional and
longitudinal research designs does not critically influence the outcome of the study
for the precise research question we are addressing. Furthermore, the effect of gross
domestic product on our focal relationship was significant and negative, implying that
8 We thank APJM Guest Editor Michael Carney for pointing out these two possible boundary conditions
to our findings.
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the benefits of concentrated ownership are somewhat more pronounced in emerging
markets than in mature economies (Stiglitz, 1994). Finally, the effect of stock market
capitalization was significant and positive. Apparently, it is easier for concentrated
owners to realize better performance in more liquid markets, presumably because
liquidity mitigates the costs of concentrated ownership (Maug, 1998).
Discussion
Concentrated ownership in Asia
The first questionwe sought to address in this paper was whether firms with concentrated
owners outperform firms lacking such owners in the Asian context. Overall, we found a
modest (.04) but positive and significant effect for our focal relationship. These results
differ from those of another recent meta-analysis by Dalton and his colleagues (Dalton
et al., 2003), who found a series of less consequential effects of ownership structure on
performance. Our findings are not, however, wholly irreconcilable with those reported
in Dalton et al. (2003). In fact, this latter study offers an important starting point for
explaining the differences in associational strength of our focal relationship which we
found across the various Asian nations in our sample (see Table 3).
The key to understanding Dalton et al._s (2003) findings is the realization that most
of the effect sizes in their study derive from a national context in which shareholders
rights are legally well-protected (i.e., the US). Since shareholders in the US can rely on
highly liquid equity markets, an active market for corporate control, strong legal
protections for shareholders, and highly effective background institutions and
judiciary, concentrated ownership does not seem to add any additional benefits in
that particular corporate governance configuration. Correspondingly, we also find non-
significant effects for our focal relationship in countries where minority shareholders_
rights are well-protected (i.e., in Hong Kong and Singapore). These findings are fully
compatible with those of Dalton et al. (2003).
In contrast, in countries where shareholder protection is historically weak—such
as in India or Taiwan—the positive effects of concentrated ownership on firm
performance are hard to deny. In these jurisdictions, investors must concentrate their
shareholdings in order to privately enforce their interests when external (public)
institutions offer little recourse (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). This finding must be
qualified in one important way, however. Our study also shows that ownership
concentration becomes less effective as the rule of law becomes weaker (see
Table 4). In other words, ownership concentration as a generic corporate governance
strategy in Asia is complementary to certain background institutions that offer
investors some minimal degree of protection. Where weak ownership protection
goes hand-in-hand with weak rule of law—such as in the case of China—even
ownership concentration ceases to be an effective corporate governance strategy.
Owner identity in Asia
The second question addressed in this paper was whether the identity of the
concentrated owner matters for the performance of Asian firms. The short answer to
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this question is that it does. Foreign owners outperform domestic owners (as
predicted by Hypothesis 2a), while market investors outperform stable owners and
inside owners (as predicted by Hypothesis 2b). Yet especially the latter finding
appears to be influenced by inter-jurisdictional differences. The pattern predicted by
Hypothesis 2b holds for India, Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, and Taiwan, but not
for Hong Kong and Singapore. What drives these differences?
One way of addressing this question is to explore the correlational “spread” between
what the firms controlled by sophisticated market investors can accomplish in a given
jurisdiction, on the one hand, and the performance of firms controlled by stable investors
(Gedajlovic et al., 2005; Gerlach, 1992), on the other. This spread is bound to be large
in markets offering weak minority protection, because stable investors will cream off
residual returns via self-dealing transactions or intergroup profit redistribution
practices (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002). In markets with strong protection, in contrast,
the spread is likely to be minimal as stable investors are denied tunneling
opportunities. In these jurisdictions, the only effective actions stable investors can
undertake to increase their private wealth is prompting firm managers to increase
performance, which is bound to benefit all shareholders of the firm and not just stable
investors. These intuitions can straightforwardly be tested by regressing the market
owner/stable owner correlational spread onto the best-available comparative measure
for minority shareholder protection: Djankov et al._s (2008) anti-self-dealing index.
See Figure 1.
The results of this exercise are telling. The fit of this univariate model is excellent
(R2=.73), implying that the legal protection of (minority) shareholders is the main
driver of the manifested differences in associational strength of our focal relationship
between owner types across national contexts. This finding has important implications
for our second research question. Owner identity does matter to the performance of
closely-held Asian firms, but only in jurisdictions that offer weak minority protection.
Here, differentially constituted and motivated owners have the opportunity to
manipulate the firms they own to pursue their own interests. Thus, while market
investors will prompt their firms towards better financial performance, stable owners
will use their firms as vehicles for business group support and private wealth creation.
In jurisdictions where minority protection is stronger, concentrated owners have fewer
opportunities to cater to their private needs. In these contexts, the legal system
represents an important constraint on organizational design, implying that owners of
Figure 1 Owner identity and corporate performance across Asia
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all types can only increase their private wealth by adopting strategies that are likely to
benefit all shareholders simultaneously. Hence, where the legal protection of minority
shareholders is strong, owner identity ceases to be a variable that influences the
associational strength of the concentrated ownership—corporate performance
relationship.
Institutions and ownership concentration in Asia
The third question this paper sought to address was whether jurisdiction-level
institutional features moderate the relationship between concentrated ownership and
firm performance in Asia. Corporate governance scholars have long tried to stress
the commonalities of the various corporate governance regimes across Asia, in
search of an overarching “Asian” model of corporate control, and thus neglecting the
influence of differences across national corporate governance regimes (Peng &
Jiang, 2006). In international comparisons, the corporate governance regimes of
three nations in particular have attracted the bulk of scholarly attention: the United
States, Germany, and Japan. All too often, the specificities of these three corporate
governance regimes have been mistakenly taken to be generic properties of the
larger geo-political context in which these nations are embedded. Thus scholars
often analyze corporate governance regimes through the respective lenses of an
“Anglo-American shareholder model,” a “continental European stakeholder model,”
and an “Asian relational model.” This paper does not deal with the Anglo-American
or continental European worlds, so we will not elaborate on those cases. Our paper
does show, however, that Japan_s corporate governance system is by no means a
generic mold after which all other Asian systems are shaped. Instead, different
corporate governance configurations co-exist in the Asian context, and the Japanese
way of governing firms is at best “merely” one configuration within this set.
As seen from one point of view, Japan is representative of a sub-set of Asian
nations in which the legal protection of minority shareholders is relatively poorly
developed, and in which dedicated market investors can reap a considerable
performance premium over multiply tied stable investors (i.e., India, South Korea,
and Taiwan; see Figure 1). Yet, seen from a different angle, Japan can also be seen as
a representative of a group of nations in which de facto expropriation of minority
shareholders is next to impossible, due to the fact that the relevant matrix of more
generic background institutions is very well-developed (i.e., Hong Kong and
Singapore; cf. Dyck & Zingales, 2004; and Kaufmann et al., 2005).
Our institutional perspective on ownership concentration in Asia thus suggests
that there are three dominant corporate governance configurations in this region.
First, there is the “high minority protection/high rule of law” cluster (including Hong
Kong and Singapore), in which the tunneling problem is not a major factor for the
majority of listed firms9 and in which there is not much difference between what
9 This observation does not hold for all firms listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX), however. Due
to the absence of legal extraterritoriality, Hong Kong’s strict rules regarding protection for minority investors do
not apply in mainland China and mainland firms listed on HKEX (which account for some 35 percent of the
value of the HKEX’s capitalization). Thus, the decisions of Hong Kong courts are not enforceable in China.
Significant expropriation of minority shareholders via tunneling is the result (Cheung et al., 2005). We thank
APJM Guest Editor Michael Carney for drawing our attention to this point.
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market and stable investors can accomplish in terms of firm performance. Second,
there is the “low minority protection/fair rule of law” cluster (including South Korea,
India, and Taiwan), in which the tunneling problem is prevalent, but in which there
is also a considerable difference between the expected returns of market and stable
investors, as the former can enforce their rights via the regular court system. Third,
there is the “low minority protection/low rule of law” cluster (including China and
the Philippines), in which not only the tunneling problem is severe, but in which
there is also no “spread” between market and stable investors, as the former cannot
rely on working background institutions to enforce their rights. Seen from this
perspective, Japan is in fact not representative for the Asian region at all, but is in
fact a difficult-to-rubricate hybrid of clusters one and two.
Conclusion
What have we learned about ownership concentration in Asia? The results reported in
this paper have generated at least three new insights into this phenomenon. First,
although this paper confirmed that ownership concentration matters in the Asian
context, it was found that Asian nations differ markedly in the degree to which
ownership concentration is an effective remedy against familiar agency problems. In
countries where legal protection of shareholders is mostly lacking, concentrated
ownership can have a profoundly positive impact on corporate performance. Yet
where legal protection is well-developed, shareholders can rely on a configuration of
mostly external corporate governance mechanisms to protect their investments and
assure a reasonable return on these investments. Ownership concentration becomes
more or less redundant in these contexts, and may even be associated with certain
costs, such as: suboptimal risk diversification and lower liquidity. Hence this paper has
shown that the two broad corporate governance strategies of ownership concentration
and relying on external governance mechanisms (e.g., Gillan, 2006) should be seen as
substitutes, not as complements (Aoki, 2001; Hollingsworth & Boyer, 1997).
Second, this paper has shown that a certain degree of institutional development,
as measured by the rule of law variable, is a necessary condition for the broad
corporate governance strategy of ownership concentration to work. We found
evidence of institutional complementarity between ownership concentration on the
one hand, and a threshold level of institutional development that secures the rule of
law in a given jurisdiction on the other.
Third, this paper has demonstrated that the identity of the concentrated owner
matters in quite a number of Asian jurisdictions. Only a very select set of nations—
notably, Hong Kong and Singapore—are able to sufficiently remedy shareholder-
manager and shareholder-shareholder agency problems by predominantly legal
means. In most other Asian nations, different kinds of concentrated owners will have
differential effects on corporate financial performance. Finally, by unpacking various
institutional influences on the effectiveness of concentrated ownership as a
governance strategy across 11 Asian jurisdictions, we have contributed to what
Peng and Jiang (2006) call an emerging “cross-country, institution-based” theory of
corporate governance that provides a more fine-grained account of the costs and
benefits of concentrated ownership in Asia.
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